
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GULF OF MEXICO
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P. Bercomcedas
Vera Cruz
YUCATAN
BAY OF
HONDURA
GUATEMALA
W. Keenan Sc. Charleston S.C.

Charleston
BAHAMA ISLANDS
LITTLE BAGAMARK
Hole in the Wall
STREAM OF FLORIDA
Key West
Tortugas I.
STRAIT
GREAT BARAMA BANK
Havana
OLD CHANNEL
Channel of Yucatan
Inagua
Turks Is.
Mayari
WINDWARD CHAN.
JAMAICA
ST. DOMINGO
CARIBBEAN
VENEZU

BERMUDAS ISLES
English.
French.
Spanish.
Danish.
Charleston
BAHAMA ISLANDS
LITTLE BAHAMA BANK
STREAM OF FLORIDA
Hole in the Wall.
STRAIT
GREAT BAHAMA BANK
OLD CHANNEL
Turks Is
Inagua
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WINDWARD CHANNEL
Mona Passage
ST DOMINGO
JAMAICA
Montserrat
Ste Cruz
Antigua
CARIBBEE OR WINDWARD ISLES
Martinico
Barbadoes
Trinidad
CARIBBEAN SEA
VENEZUELA
RIVER ORINOCO
BRITISH GUYANA

assertion, that these maimed individuals are to be met with as rarely as maimed individuals among the laboring population of any other country. For ourselves, we can go much farther than this. With all the opportunities before mentioned, we solemnly aver, that we do not know of a single negro in the Southern country minus an ear, eye or nose. Nay, we do not know one that is branded, and we have never seen one with the ball and chains described by our author.

Now, to come to perhaps a vulgar, but strong common sense way of presenting the issue, "*there is certainly a lie between us.*"

Indeed there are many of them, and we are ready and willing to abide the issue. We challenge Mr. Dickens, and and all his fanatic accessories before the fact, to this issue of veracity. We will prove that we not only have all the ears (both black and white) that we were naturally endowed with, but we *will prove our title to wear them!*

Art. III.—*The Maritime Interests of the South and West.*

The South has claims, and the West a direct interest in the Navy; the shores of the one are without their proper defences, and the Gulf commerce of the other at the mercy of all who may spoil it in war. Hitherto, those claims have been disallowed, and this interest neglected, because these two regions lacked the numerical strength in the halls of Federal legislation, to carry through, by might, those bills of right, which have been withheld by the Federal power of the North and the East. Ever since the war, the South and the West have freely and liberally contributed to the support of the Navy. They have seen the sea-board, from Norfolk along to the Eastward, studded with forts, castles and dock yards, with large naval establishments, and all the means of coast defence,—they have seen millions expended for the harbor defences of our small towns at the North, while they have not been able to get one dollar appropriated for their Gulf defences, by fortifying the dry Tortugas, by far the most exposed and important point along the whole extent of our sea-coast, and the key to all the wealth that

the Mississippi pours down into the Gulf. The South and West have been burthened with protective tariffs for the benefit of the North,—they have, moreover, cast into the public treasury liberally of their substance for naval appropriations; for thirty years, they have seen these large appropriations drawn from them and sent to the North for disbursement, when their own commerce was left thus exposed and naked.

The new ratio of representation will strengthen these two regions in Congress, and give their legislators the power of righting those national and sectional wrongs. The dry Tortugas must be fortified, and the commercial interests of the West considered in Congress. The Navy, that is intended for Gulf protection, must no longer be built and manned and equipped at the North, and sent down to the Gulf as to a foreign country, to return again, whence they came, to be paid off. Ships sent there, in case they were crippled in action, or in a gale, or by accident, must no longer be under the necessity of returning two thousand miles to the North for repairs, as they now do, and for twenty years have been doing. There are fifteen thousand boatmen on the Western rivers,—there is no lack of seamen in Charleston and New-Orleans, in Mobile and other Southern ports, for all the purposes of Gulf defence. We have, in great abundance, here, all and the best materials for ship building and a Navy; and we hope to see, at the approaching session of Congress, Southern and Western members uniting and co-operating with each other, to secure justice to the South, and fair play to the West, in the matter of Gulf defences and protection, naval supplies and federal disbursements. The chief measures we advocate, are three, viz.: a boat-yard at Memphis, for steamers of war; a dock-yard at Pensacola, for building and repairing ships: and the occupying the Tortugas with forts for protecting, magazines and workshops for repairing and refitting disabled ships in war.

Though the first frigates—the Constitution, the United States, and one or two others, were built in 1797, the existence of the American Navy should be dated from the war of 1812. Up to that time the few ships owned by the United States, were not generally considered as protectors in peace. and defenders in war; but they were viewed rather in the light of a foundling laid at the door of the rich man, who, for the want of a poor house wherein to lodge it, feels

himself compelled. by a decent regard for the opinions of others, to maintain it at some expense and perhaps inconvenience to himself. But it is never cherished with affection, nor looked upon with favor, unless by noble and gallant bearing, it may chance to win its way to the heart of its patron. So with our armed ships; they were ungraciously looked upon by the people, and considered by legislators as the unwelcome and burthensome, but perhaps necessary appendages of the new political station we were beginning to occupy in the society of nations. Nevertheless, those ships were cast-aways in the public mind, the expense of which the nation would have been glad to rid itself of, by putting them upon the poor-house establishment, could the riddance have been effected consistently with our dignity and a due regard for the national honor. Finally, when the war came, the government was afraid to trust its sea bantlings out of their element. It was discussed whether or not they should be dismantled and shut up in port, as the surest means of preserving them. While such discussions were going on, the Constitution stole off to sea; in a few days she fell in with, and, to the astonishment of friend and foe, captured a British frigate of her own class. When she came back into port, and modestly told how she had met the enemy, the heart in every American bosom swelled with patriotic pride, and the astonished nation leaped for very joy.

From that moment, the Navy was taken into favor, and has ever since been considered as the right arm of national defence.

The popular enthusiasm, called forth by the exploits of the Navy, knew no bounds. Straightway, the keels of four ships of the line, and six large frigates were ordered to be laid down, and two million and a half of dollars were appropriated for commencing the work. Other appropriations were also made with open hearts and liberal hands. It was decided to place the Navy upon a broad and permanent foundation. Three million of dollars were appropriated by one act, and eight by another, for its gradual increase and improvement. Since that time,—since this sea bantling plucked up its country's drowning honor by the locks, and fought itself into favor with the people, they have expended upon it more than one hundred and fifty millions of dollars.

The disbursement of large sums of money brings many advantages to the community in which it takes place; it

gives occupation to the poor man and bread to the needy; it stimulates industry, enlarges prosperity, and crowns society with manifold blessings. What part of these immense appropriations has been expended at the South, or what benefits has the West derived from them? Literally none. We shall show that it would be beneficial, just and equitable, not only to these sections, but conducive to the national interests, to divert in future a fair proportion of these expenditures from the North, and to make them at the South in building up the public coast defences, and in founding there such naval establishments, and places of rendezvous and safety for the commerce of the West, as the weal of the commonwealth, the interests and honor of the nation require. While we consider this subject in the broad light of its national bearings and importance, we think it neither ill-timed, nor out of place, to glance at it also in a sectional point of view. The South and the West have long, silently and cheerfully, submitted to the evils of the partial legislation imposed upon them. They have been taxed indirectly in the shape of tariffs of protection, and directly in the shape of tariffs of revenue. The millions thus drawn from them, whether collected at the federal toll-gate, or in the workshops of the protected laborer, have all been carried to the North and the East for disbursement and circulation. There the fruits of protection have been gathered; and there too have been monopolized the magnificent appropriations for the Navy. Virginia and the North have clubbed together in this matter; they have wrung from the Navy, at the expense of the South, all the local advantages that may be derived from it. Within these States, all our Navy Yards are to be found; there our ships of war have been built and repaired; and there the money appropriated for the increase, improvement and repair of the Navy, has been expended. Whether these States have deliberately agreed among themselves in this thing or not, it matters little; the effect is the same as though they had clubbed together to cheat the South and West. They have outvoted in Congress, and have carried through what bills they would. They have had the power to right the wrongs which, year after year, have been practised there upon the South and the West, but they would not. Year after year, their language has been, Give! Give! it is for the Navy, a common bulwark for a common good. Year after year, the South and the West have freely given,

and been as freely left to hold the bag. They have not been permitted to draw a gain from this common fund as the national interests and their own necessities required. They have been compelled to forego all the sectional advantages which the disbursement of large sums of public money has conferred upon Virginia and her Northern confederates. From Norfolk, on the Chesapeake, to Passamaquoddy, in Maine, a distance of seven hundred miles, there are not less than six well appointed Navy Yards, which give constant employment to thousands of our fellow-citizens, and call yearly for the expenditure of millions from the public treasury. From Norfolk, around by the Gulf of Florida to the South of the Sabine, a distance of two thousand miles, the first dollar has yet to be expended in the building of a ship for the Navy. We crave pardon of the Palmetto State and its noble matrons; the ladies of Charleston, in chivalrous compliment to the Navy, and with a grace of patriotism never surpassed, had built, at their own expense, in this city, and presented to the nation, a beautiful corvette of war. Her name and the gift have been perpetuated to the Navy, and are handed down to us, in one of the most beautiful specimens of naval architecture that has ever graced the ocean. Beyond this, the Navy can boast of no vessel of Southern mould. And so exclusive has been the monopoly of all naval disbursements by the States referred to, that the South has not been allowed to make even so much as a scupper nail or a pump tack for it.

It is true, the South has been entertained with the so called Navy Yard at Pensacola. Pleased with the name, Southern legislators have seldom thought to inquire into its condition. It is in a remote part of the country, out of the line of the great thoroughfares of travellers; few visit it, and they are surprised to find it a mere place of deposit for a few stores brought and left there by vessels from the North. A ship has never been built or repaired there; nor is there a shop or a mechanic, the *material*, nor means of any kind for building or repairing ships at that *Yard* (*?*). Disabled cutters have been sent thence to the private ship yards of Charleston even to have their sides caulked. And if a larger vessel of the West India squadron sustains an injury ever so slight; if she even finds a few shell-fish sticking to her bottom, she must and does go fifteen hundred or two thousand miles, to the North, to have them scraped off.

We copy the following from the Army and Navy Chronicle of May 11th, printed at Washington. On such subjects it speaks authoritatively:

"NEW SLOOPS OF WAR.—Preparatory orders have been issued for building, as early as practicable, a first class sloop-of-war, at *each of our Navy Yards*, viz: Portsmouth, N. H., Charlestown, Brooklyn, Philadelphia, Washington, and Norfolk. SIX IN ALL."

Here we have proofs, that really and practically, Pensacola is not considered in the light of a Navy Yard. No mention is made of it, and there is no building to be done at it.

Restive under the sense of continued injustice, of withholding all naval appropriations from their constituents for disbursements, Southern members, at the last session of Congress, succeeded, with more zeal than judgment, in diverting from New-York, an appropriation of one hundred thousand dollars for a floating dock at Pensacola; we were present on the occasion, and were reminded of a country lad we once saw, buying a purse and begging the shop-keeper to "trust" him for it. Under present circumstances, there is about the same use for a floating dock at Pensacola as there was for a purse to this primitive lad. All the materials for repairs are wanting there, and when a ship in the Gulf wants repairs, advantage will be taken of this circumstance, and she will be still sent to the North, where the materials are already provided and the workmen at hand. The want of these at Pensacola, and the collecting them in small quantities and from a great distance would consume much time, and in this state of things, any slight repairs upon the first vessel will cost many times as much, as they would at the abundantly supplied Navy Yards at the North. The quick-sighted members from the building districts at the North, saw this at a glance, and suffered the South to take the bait. For obvious reasons, the first ship that is repaired on this dock will cost a good round sum, and this enormous cost will be advanced as a reason why no more repairing should be done at the South. Or, should the officers, on account of the expense and delay of first collecting materials and getting the workmen together, or on account of many other difficulties of having work done at a yard so poorly provided with means and facilities, as Pensacola has ever been, be deterred from having their ships repaired there—as it is likely they will—the Southrons hereafter, when they ask for any naval appropriations for Pensacola, will always be answered with

a twit at their useless floating dock. We could not but regret that they had not procured, in its stead, the building of one or more of those new sloops-of-war at Pensacola.

Our Southern and Western readers who have never experienced any of the advantages which the annual disbursement of large sums of public money confers upon the community in which it takes place, may perhaps derive some idea of the consideration in which it is held at the North, where public expenditures have been so long and so bountifully made, and felt, and enjoyed. An order from Washington to suspend labor in the Navy Yard at Philadelphia, and therefore to curtail the disbursements there of public money, is enough to cause an uproar among the people, even in that quiet city; straightway public meetings are called, speeches made, committees appointed, resolutions adopted, and deputations sent on to remonstrate with the Executive. And now, while we write, the great city of New-York is all agog, because a vessel of war is to be sent thence for repairs, and the money expended upon her, to be put into the channels of circulation at Boston, instead of Brooklyn.

Such, in the North, is the store and value set upon the collateral and local benefits resulting from the expenditure there of the naval appropriations; still, all of these benefits have been withheld from the South and the West, by the federal power of the monopolists. Because they are thus esteemed at the North, and have been so withheld from the South, are they therefore of no value to the Southern and Western people? Shall they bear the burthens and taxation, and share none of its benefits? Are such considerations to be counted as nothing, in urging the claims of these two sections to adequate defences for their sea-coasts? Is it nothing, that they have been allowed neither part nor lot in the great advantages of disbursing the one hundred and fifty million of dollars that have been appropriated from a common fund, for the Navy,—nothing of federal partiality and injustice to complain of, that the laborer of the North has been protected, and that, for this protection alone, Southern and Western industry has been taxed to the amount of untold millions? Do we see the evidences of fair dealing and even handed justice between the North and the South, the East and the West, when public documents and official returns show us in figures, that the sea-board, from Norfolk to the St. John's, has been protected with harbor defences at the

rate of eleven thousand three hundred dollars for every mile of coast, while two thousand six hundred dollars is all that the sea mile will average for coast and harbor defence from the "Old North State" around to the Sabine? Shall Southern and Western statesmen, in advocating their rights to an equal share of federal support and protection,—to a just and fair proportion to the local advantages incident to this avowed protection, be told that it is narrow-minded, selfish and unpatriotic to advance their claims upon the contracted limits of sectional grounds? Be it so. Blot them out. Let them be unsaid, unread and forgotten. We will take our stand on high grounds. We plead our just cause, upon the broad platform of public good, and with the honor and safety of our country to support us in argument, we urge our right to a just share in the national defences of the commonwealth. All we claim for the South and the West, is demanded alike by the national interests, the necessities, the welfare and safety of the whole country. And, upon these grounds, we advance our claims.

Incident to this subject, and preliminary to a right view of it, in this light, is a knowledge of the winds and currents, the navigation and geographical situation of the Gulf of Mexico. It is our Mediterranean, and like that of the old world, has but one out-let. This out-let is afforded by the Gulf stream at its exit through the straits of Florida, between the Island of Cuba with the Bahamas on one side, and the American Peninsula on the other. We beg the reader's attention to the annexed chart, and hope he will bear with us, in a paragraph or two of uninteresting "sailing directions," and the dryer details of wind and weather.

Between the parallels of 28° and 8° North, what is called the N. E. Trade wind prevails the year round; though towards the lower parallel, its general direction is never from the Eastward. All navigators count as surely upon this wind between these parallels, as the Western boatmen do upon a downward current on the Mississippi. In the Gulf, and among the Antilles, the regular "Trades" at particular seasons of the year, give place to hurricanes and tornadoes, and to a wind called the "*Norths*." These though are unstable in their character; they come at uncertain periods and blow for no fixed time. Hence, though these and the *Tendavales* in the Caribbean Sea, might sometimes enable a vessel bound from the Gulf to the Windward Islands or

to sea, to pass down through the channel of Yucatan into the Carribbean Sea, and thence out through the Mona passage, or between some of the Islands to the South of it, such a passage is utterly impracticable, and is never attempted on account of the prevailing head winds and opposing currents, which sweep in through these passages. These currents come in from the Eastward to restore the waste created by the Gulf stream; we have marked their course on the chart with a feathered arrow. After running nearly across the Carribbean Sea, they set North through the Yucatan channel, and are frequently known to heave vessels along at the rate of sixty miles or more in a day. It often happens, that vessels bound from Jamaica, or even from the Spanish main, to Europe, instead of shaping an Eastwardly course right out among the Islands, find it more expeditious to steer N. W., through the Yucatan channel, and then go out by the Florida pass. Indeed, vessels bound from Jamaica to Inagua, after making Cape Maysi in the Windward channel between Cuba and St. Domingo, have been compelled, by the force of adverse winds and currents, to put about, and take the track represented by the unfeathered arrows, through the Gulf of Mexico, and so out by the Tortugas and Key West in the Florida Straits. Of all seasons, a passage out to sea to the South of Cuba, is most impracticable from January to April inclusive—the time of year when the cotton crop is going to market, and when our trade from the Gulf is in its greatest activity.

The unfeathered arrows in the Gulf show the outward track of all vessels from any of its ports, whether bound to Europe, to Trinidad, to any of the Windward Islands, or even to the ports of Venezuela. Whether sailing from the ports of Mexico, of Texas, or of the United States, there is, on account of the Carribbean winds and currents already described, but one out-let for them, and that is along by the Tortugas as before explained, so that a vessel from Vera Cruz or Galveston, though only bound to Jamaica or St. Domingo, must pass through these straits, then to windward, and so back, by the South side of Cuba.

With this explanation, it appears that there is but one way out of the Gulf of Mexico, and that, practically, it is as much of a closed sea as the Mediterranean, and is more easily blockaded; for the Straits of Gibraltar are as a door which a vessel may pass in a few hours, and then be out upon the

broad ocean with a chance of escape. Not so with the Straits of Florida;—they are as a long lane, through which a vessel must drive with head winds, for as many days, before she can get fairly out upon the open sea; all the way in this channel she is exposed to the mercy of an enemy, without the chance of escape; for, if pursued, she can neither put back, nor turn to the right hand, nor to the left, out of his way; her own coasts, on the left, afford her no place of refuge, not having a single fortified port or harbor in its whole length, while those on the right belong to the enemy. This pass is about four hundred and fifty miles long with an average breadth of perhaps fifty miles. Hence the remark so often made by military men, that the mouth of the Mississippi is at these Straits and not at the Balize. Indeed, the Gulf and Western States would be less exposed to the attacks of an enemy, if the Yucatan pass were a sand bar, and the Straits of Florida the only entrance, as they are the only out-let, to the Gulf.

The encroachments of England, in this part of the world, have been by little and little, but steady and progressive. We have marked, with a black flag, the possessions here of this island poacher, and if the reader will but turn again to the chart, he will see the black flag planted on the Peninsula of Yucatan, and on the Mosquito shore,—on the islands of Trinidad, Barbadoes, Antigua and Jamaica,—and on the main, below the Orinoco. It is seen away off in the ocean too, at that "hellish place," as the early navigators called the Bermudas, where she has planted an important naval station, from which, in war, her armed cruisers, with their blackamore regiments, twenty thousand strong, may overlook Charleston, or make their descent at will, upon the Atlantic ports of the South.

Nor is this all, if we look to the Bahamas and the hundreds of green islands that dot the sea at the North and East of Cuba, we shall find that they too are under the black flag, and that Great Britain holds, with her strong arm, every key, rock and shoal among them, upon which man may dwell, or sea-birds brood. The turret crowned battlements that guard her West India colonies, are only regarded *now* by the American mariner, as land marks to guide him in safety to his haven; yet, when he looks forward to the contingencies of war, and considers the feeble state of the Gulf defences of his own country, and the prox-

imity of these islands to the Florida pass, his mind is filled with painful apprehensions for the insecure commerce of the South Western States.

Though all of the English West India Islands, that are worth the expense of capture, are sufficiently fortified for self defence,—several of them, as Jamaica, Barbadoes, and Antigua, are prepared also for aggression. Well furnished magazines and arsenals have been established among them, and large quantities of military and naval stores are lodged there. They have their dock yards, at which single ships of war may be equipped, and crippled fleets received to repair damages in war, and make ready again for the enemy.

Along the outward chain of West India Islands from the Orinoco to the North of Cuba, she has established a cordon of naval and military posts, that, at the first out-break of war, will give her complete command not only of the Carribbean sea, but also of the Gulf of Mexico; not a rag of American commerce could quit the Gulf, except with the payment of such tribute as her cruisers in mercy should exact. If an American merchantman should attempt the Yucatan passage against the winds and currents of the Carribbean sea, a mere inspection of the map will show that England has an island with its military post either on one edge or in the middle, of every outlet and entrance to that sea; all the passages are so narrow, that ships, in going through, may see the shore on either hand. Escape that way, even if the winds and currents, instead of being adverse, were favorable, would be utterly impracticable. And, as for the Florida pass, the possessions of Great Britain are washed by their Eastern edge. By means of her naval stations and military depots among the West India Islands, she is on the very borders of the Gulf; whereas, we, with ours, are two thousand miles off. And owing to this remoteness from our place of repair and equipment, a force, comparatively insignificant, might hold the Gulf commerce of the United States entirely at its mercy; for should the ships which we might send there to protect it, be crippled in a gale, or disabled in battle, they could, on their long and tedious passages to the distant Navy Yards of the North, be pursued, and ultimately made prizes to a force that, in itself, and under other circumstances, would be utterly insignificant. The most disabled ship of a squadron regulates the speed of the rest; they must stay by to guard and assist her. England has her islands and places of ren-

dezvous on every side of such a squadron, bound to the North; and, with short notice, she could despatch any number of swift-footed vessels to harass and to cripple it still more.

Though Great Britain is the chief owner of the West Indies, and most deserving of our attention at present, she is by no means our only neighbor at the South. Bordering on the Mexican Gulf and Carribbean sea, are Texans and Mexicans, Yucatecos and Gutamalenos, Carricaneans and Venezuelans, Sweeds, Danes and Dutch, French, Haytiens and Spaniards. Most of these, it is true, are too weak, unstable or insignificant at present, to command attention; yet, in the ever changing vicissitudes of people and nations, any or all of these may, in time, become troublesome, if not formidable neighbors. We are situated down stream with regard to them all. With wind and tide in their favor, our defenceless coast would but invite attack. At the first onslaught, the Gulf States would, in a military point of view, occupy the position of an army in the plain, which, from its position, is compelled to wait and watch the enemy's movements from the heights above. In case of such a descent, shall we send to the North for the Navy to come and drive the enemy away? Should we not rather build up a dock yard at Memphis, from which we too could send down our swift cruisers? For if any of the great naval powers were the assailant, she would block up the Straits of Florida, keep out the Navy, and compel the Southern people to look again to their cotton bags for defence.

In a war with England, was ever a French fleet known to pass the Straits of Gibraltar against her will? She has barred up that rock-made door with a thousand pieces of cannon, and, by her strong guard of that pass, she has always weakened the power of France on the ocean, by dividing the French Navy—one part of which she has constantly locked up in the Mediterranean, and the other part she has as invariably locked out. As complete as is her command over the entrance to this sea, she has, by means of her arts and arms, and those "ancient and unsubsidized allies of the realm," as the winds of heaven have been called, made herself complete mistress over one entrance to our Mediterranean Gulf. What, therefore, though we should erect a Toulon at Pensacola, and line the Mississippi with boat yards? There is not, from Pensacola, around by the

Capes of Florida, to Savannah, in Georgia, a distance of a thousand miles, one single fortified harbor or port of refuge to which the trader, if pursued by an enemy, could flee for shelter. Unless we should secure some strong point within this distance, England, from her greater proximity, by means of her strong holds in the West Indies, would command this pass also; she could turn the key upon our gulf forces, and effectually divide and weaken our Navy, by locking up one part of it in the Gulf, and shutting out the other from its assistance.

Of all sections of the Union, the States on the Gulf and South Atlantic are most open to aggression and liable to attack. Here, national defences are most needed, and should be the strongest; but here they have been most neglected, and are the weakest. Shall the North be defended and not also the South? Consider the commercial resources of the South and West—their kind soil and genial climates—their present wealth and future destiny—and say, why is it that so little has been done to foster their interests in peace, to protect their merchandize in war? Is it because the North exclusively is the source of trade—the producer and the exporter of all the great staples of commerce? Far from it. We have explained the exposed situation of the Gulf, and dwelt on the neglected defences of the South. We shall now endeavor to show, for we think we can, that at least two-thirds of this commerce takes its rise in these neglected regions, and first tempts the dangers of the sea in this exposed quarter.

The commerce of the United States is estimated, by the Secretary of the Navy, in his last annual report, at one hundred and fifty million of dollars the year. This estimate includes only the value of those articles of American production, which are exposed to the perils of the sea on their way to market, whether in the coasting or the foreign trade. We include the coasting trade, because a vessel with a cargo from New-Orleans to New-York or Boston is just as much exposed to dangers, and requires the same degree of protection, on her way out from the Gulf, as though she were bound to Europe. Of what, let us ask, by the way, does this yearly commerce of one hundred and fifty million of dollars consist? It consists chiefly of cotton, of sugar and tobacco, of corn, rice and flour, of pork, hemp, lard and beef. Where do these articles grow, and whence do they come?

They grow upon the savannahs of the South, and come down from the plains of the West, through a thousand streams and channels to the Gulf of Mexico, that great ventricle of commerce; where, receiving a new impulse, they are sent out through the exposed Straits of Florida, into those ramified veins of trade, which give life and health, vigor and animation to all parts of our great commercial system.

With these questions and explanations, we enter upon the proof of our proposition, by first taking a hasty glance at the cotton trade, the great staple of American commerce.

We have before us a memorandum obtained from the private papers of our venerable consul at Liverpool, the late Mr. James Maury. In it, the imports there of American cotton, are stated

At	5	bales in	3	vessels for	1785.
	6	"	2	"	1786.
	108	"	5	"	1787.
	282	"	6	"	1788.

Whereas, during only one week in the month of March, 1843, there arrived, in that port, not less than 177,515 bales, brought from the United States by such a fleet of ships as never before had been seen to enter that harbor. This immense yield was all the product of the South, but not a tithe of the last crop grown there. The entire crop of 1842 did not fall much short of two and a half million* of bales, which, at the low average of five cents a pound or twenty dollars a bale, gives fifty millions, or one-third of the whole commerce of the country, in this one item alone. At least three-fourths of this passed through the Straits of Florida, a prey to whomsoever would spoil it.

Are Southern planters content with this? Be it so. They, of all others, have the deepest stake in hedge; to prop and uphold it, is becoming more and more important every day, and the inducements to pluck it, greater and greater every year. The growth of cotton in the South Atlantic States has remained nearly stationary for the eighteen years from 1824 to 1841 inclusive; but, during the same period, in the Gulf States, it has regularly doubled itself every six years. We quote from the Commercial Circular, of March 30th, of Maury & Brothers, New-York, whose statements are worthy of the utmost confidence.

* It was about 2,350,000 bales.

Actual averages of the eighteen cotton crops from 1824 to 1841.

	1st 6 years.	2d 6 years.	3d 6 years.
Atlantic States,	433,000 bales	522,000 bales	529,000 bales
Gulf States,	253,000 "	504,000 "	1,030.000 "

According to the rate and ratio here involved, the Gulf crop of 1842—the last in market—should not fall short of 1,600,000 bales,—its actual amount was over 1,700,000. If we attempt to calculate the resources of this region, or to estimate its growing and future commercial importance, we shall not be able to assign any limits thereto, except those of demand and supply. When the first handful of cotton arrived in England, half a century ago, could it have entered into the mind of Adam Smith, or of the most gifted seer, that has ever indulged visions of political economy, to conceive that the fleecy cargo which was then seen coming over the sea, was destined to spread itself, in a little while, like Ahab's cloud, over the realms of commerce, and to make the broad ocean white with ships and trade? So requisite and indispensable has this article now become in our domestic economy, that we, of the present day, cannot well conceive wherewith man was clothed in comfort before he used cotton as raiment. As its growth and consumption, in times past, have baffled all calculations, so they may, in times to come. To others, but not to us, it belongs to interpret and expound those laws of trade, by which its future increase is to be regulated, and the ultimate bounds set to its wars. But as for the resources of this cotton region, and its *capacities* of supply, there appear to be no limits, which fancy, in its widest range, may reach. If we take a bale, as the average yield of an acre of ground, the statistics of the last census show, that the whole quantity of land planted down and cultivated in cotton, throughout a'l the Southern and Western States, would not, if brought near and thrown altogether into one broad plantation, equal the twelfth part of the State of Mississippi alone.

In the actual enjoyment of such a trade, and with such prospects of commercial grandeur and future wealth before them,—with the voice of the sea, and the noise of its waves continually to remind them of its defenceless borders, and the dangers to which their commerce is exposed upon it,—with the living picture of helpless and unprotected merchantmen reflected from the still waters of their harbors, for

daily contemplation,—why should the people of the South and West longer hold their peace?

That the means of coast defence and naval protection at the South, should have been considered of little or no importance to the nation at large, thirty years ago, is not surprising; for then, the quantity of Southern and Western produce that was sent to sea for a market, was comparatively of but little value. The cultivation of cotton was then in its infancy, and the rewards of the country neither developed nor understood. But now, by remaining inactive upon this subject, Southern and Western statesmen would be neither loyal to their country, true to themselves, nor faithful over the important trusts handed down to them for their own political well-being, and for the benefit of succeeding generations. One of the great objects of our fathers in the federal compact, was mutual defence to the States,—protection in life, liberty and property to those among us "who go down to the sea in ships, and do business upon the great waters." For this, we have twice been at war; for this harbors are fortified, and armed cruisers commissioned to roam the ocean; it was for this, that a Navy was created and is maintained; and under the spirit of this it is, that we claim for the South means sufficient for protection and defence, or at least equal to those afforded to the North.

In 1830, there was no direct commercial intercourse between this country and the British possessions in the West Indies. The proclamation of that year opened the ports of those islands to our agricultural produce, from which has sprung up a trade of four or five millions a year, chiefly with Southern and Western produce as the basis; the corn trade from New-Orleans alone amounting annually to two or three million of bushels. Since then, the crown duties upon Western pork and lard have been remitted by Act of Parliament, and they may now be imported into the English West Indies, subject only to colonial duties. This has given a fresh impulse to the lard trade, which is a new business just started up within the last year or two, through New Orleans, and bids fair, in a short time, to rival the whale fishery* in value; armed cruisers are sent round the world to give protection to this latter in every sea, for it is a Northern

* *Rival the whale fishery.* The receipts of lard at New-Orleans, for the season up to 14th June, were 6,000,000 gallons.

interest—and, as Southerners, it is our pride and boast that it should be so protected; but as for the safe conduct of the former, and all the commercial wealth of the regions whence it comes, nothing has been done to secure a safe passage for it in war, even as far as the ocean. The whaling interest is not more at the mercy of an enemy upon the shores of Japan, than are the market ships of the South and West in the Straits of Florida.

Almost every year witnesses the introduction into the Crescent City of some new article of trade from the teeming valley of the West. There is no city in the world with such a back country, and so many undeveloped resources as this, and, as a commercial emporium, none so much in its infancy. Yet its friends have stood by and witnessed the unaided struggles of this young Hercules with the monsters sent down in the jealousy of a Northern Juno to strangle it in its cradle. The public treasury has been taxed with heavy expenditures for building sea-walls and breakwaters at the North; but what, in comparison, has been done to deepen the bars at the Balize, or to keep open a navigable channel up to New-Orleans? The first standard that was unfurled in the cause of independence, had, for device, a disjointed snake, of which New England was represented by the head, Georgia by the tail, and each of the other States in order, by a joint. Over this was inscribed "unite or die." This was a favorite conceit at the North, and is still to be seen on some of the early court-of-arms proposed for those States; and to this day, a part of it is preserved on the seal of the War Department. Was there not, in this device, something emblematical of the relations which the South has since been made to hold to the North? Wiley and grasping, the North has enjoyed every thing like favor and protection, from the federal arms, while the South has been put off with a mere rattle. More money has been expended in fortifying and protecting the port of Norfolk, than for Pensacola, Mobile, New-Orleans, and all the the Gulf coast and harbors put together, and yet, in a commercial point of view, Norfolk can scarce boast of more trade* than the quiet little town of

* We do not deny the importance of defending the Navy Yard, nor do we mean to imply that Norfolk is too strongly or unnecessarily fortified. But the establishing there of a Navy Yard, was made a reason for erecting three splendid forts. And, as one thing leads on to another, we would have a Navy Yard at Memphis: first, because it is required there for the

Memphis with its 100,000 bales of cotton, besides large quantities of other produce.

The interest of this subject, with its enticing corollaries, has led us off from the problem before us. We set out with the proposition that at least two-thirds of the commerce of the United States—taking it at one hundred and fifty million of dollars a year—are supplied from the South and West. We have shown that one-third, or fifty millions, are furnished in the item of cotton alone. We return now to the text, and proceed with the demonstration, quoting official documents for proof.

We have been accustomed to consider Pennsylvania and New-York as great grain growing States, and to look upon the cotton growing States as consumers, rather than producers of this article. But the census of 1840 shows the true state of the case to be far different from this. Including all the cereal grains, New-York averages but 21 bushels to the inhabitant,—Georgia, 35,—Pennsylvania but 33, and Tennessee, 68.* Taking away the cotton from the produce of those States which grow it, and viewing them in the light of grain growers only, the census shows that they average a greater yield of bread stuffs, than their sister States at the North and East, who, for the last thirty years, have been wringing from them the sinews of war, and grinding them down with taxes and tariffs of protection. The average quantity of wheat, corn, and other cereal grains produced in New England and the Atlantic States, as far down as Virginia included, is twenty-two bushels for each person.—Whereas the cotton growing States, viz:—the two Carolinas, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, Arkansas and Tennessee, yield a like average of forty-four bushels, or just double.

If we bear in mind the fact, that wheat is the great article of food for man at the North, and Indian corn at the South; and if we consider farther that the slaves and laboring classes of whites at the South, consume no flour, but use corn bread exclusively, we shall find that Georgia is quite as likely as New-York to be an exporter of wheat. Dietetic writers

public good, as that at Norfolk was, and next, on account of the sectional advantages that it would draw after it, and which need not be enumerated here.

* In all of these averages of bread stuffs, we have first deducted one tenth for seed, which is too much for the Western and not enough for the Eastern and Middle States.

agree, that there is more alimentary matter in corn bread than in that of any other grain, and the plantation allowance of this to a slave is about ten bushels the year, being at the rate of a peck of meal a week. The sailor's allowance for duff and bread in the Navy, is at the rate of nine bushels of wheat for each person a year; McCulloch allows an average of eight bushels of wheat a year for bread alone, to each person who uses it in England. And though we believe it is as common among all classes in New-York as corn bread is with us at the South, still, if we allow to each person in New-York but half the navy ration of flour—and this appears to us to be scanty enough—leaving the deficiency to me made up of oat meal, rye bread, &c. the people of this great grain growing State, will have for market only a peck of wheat apiece—not enough to furnish the factory girls of Lowell with starch and sizing for their calicoes.

The general average of grain grown in the United States is thirty-two bushels to the inhabitant, first deducting a tenth for seed. The average for the Northern States, Virginia and the District of Columbia included among them, is twenty-two bushels; that of the Southern and Western States and Territories, forty-two bushels; and that of the cotton growing States alone, forty-four bushels to each person, as before stated. These last have a sea front on the Gulf of Mexico, quite equal in extent to the Atlantic coast from Norfolk to the highland ridge of Maine. Now suppose that for the next thirty years, federal legislation should be as partial to this Gulf coast, as, for the last thirty years, it has been to that of the North,—that the shores of the Gulf should be strengthened with forts and studded with castles, at the rate of eleven thousand dollars a mile,—that national dock yards should be planted along them and the Mississippi, to match those at the North,—that all of our ships-of-war should be built and launched, equipped and repaired here,—that here, their crews should be provisioned and clothed, paid off and discharged,—that all the public rope-walks, the timber sheds, the work-shops and ship-houses,—the magnificent hospitals, and naval asylums of the North, should be transplanted here,—that the whole Navy should be supplied with its every want at the South, as it now is at the North,—that the one hundred and sixty millions of money expended there upon it, should, in turn, be lavished upon it through the industry of the South,—and, *nomine mutato*, let us

suppose that the untold millions which have been drawn from the South, to foster and protect and reward the labor of the North, should be given back to this region as a bounty on its cotton, its corn, and its oil,—suppose, we say, that the Gulf States should be left in the uninterrupted enjoyment of all these advantages for thirty years to come, what would be the condition and appearance of the country? The whole land, from the Calcaser to the Sarrybel, would present one vast extent of park and lawn—a succession of field, grove and garden, for which Ceres and her nymphs might forsake their hunts,—Pan, Faunus, and the whole train of Sylvan Deities, their orgies, there to dwell and make glad the heart of man. With such protection, the Gulf borders would beggar description, and vie with the most gorgeous scenes of fable and romance.

The population of the United States, according to the sixth census, may be stated at seventeen millions* in round numbers, being nearly equally divided between Virginia and the Northern States on the one part, and North Carolina with the Southern and Western States on the other—the latter division numbering 8,470,658 souls, or within less than a hundred thousand of exactly one-half. The same returns show that all the cotton, more than half the wheat, nearly four-fifths of the corn, quite three-fourths of the hogs, all the rice and the hemp, most of the tobacco, and, commercially speaking, all the sugar, that are grown, raised, or produced in the whole country, come from this section. Here, the tillers of the ground reap, at each returning harvest, and gather into their barns, forty millions of bushels of wheat, and three hundred millions of bushels of corn, besides sixty millions of other cereal grains, such as oats, barley, rye. They also grow eighty millions of pounds of rice, one hundred and thirty-five millions of sugar, and one hundred and twenty millions of tobacco, and feed, chiefly upon the wild mast of their woodlands, vast herds of swine, twenty millions in number.

These immense harvests cannot be consumed by the eight millions and a half of producers. The average consumption of cereal grains, as food for man and beast, is quoted by McCulloch at fifteen bushels for each person; Chas. Smith, the well informed author of the *Tracts on the Corn Trade*, estimated it to be at the rate of about twelve and a half

* There were 17,063,353 of inhabitants.

bushels a year to the inhabitant. We see no reason why the laboring man in the West or South, with rich pastures and wide ranges for his cattle—with his own bountiful board spread thrice a day with meats, fruits and vegetables, should average, for himself and his cattle, as much bread and grain as the laboring man in England, in whose scanty dietary, bread is the chief, and often the only article of food. Nevertheless, let us suppose that each inhabitant here requires, for himself and his live stock, from a third to a half more grain and bread-stuffs, than is allowed to one man and his cattle in England. This estimate will leave, after deducting one-tenth of the whole for seed, a surplus of at least one hundred and ninety millions of bushels in our favored region, to be disposed of in some way. The earth grew it by the sweat of man's brow; and it was not gathered by him with toil and labor, to be scattered to the winds, or burned in the fire. It cannot be consumed by the producers, and is for sale,—therefore it must be sent abroad as merchandize to seek a market. Let us suppose that one-fifth goes by the way of the Lakes, or is driven over into the neighboring States as live stock. The remainder is crowded into the channels of river trade, and sent down to New-Orleans or some other sea-port of the South for exportation. Whether it enters into the foreign or the coasting trade, all that is shipped on the Gulf, has to pass out through the Straits of Florida, and is exposed alike to any dangers or obstructions that an enemy may throw in that long and narrow pass.

It is immaterial to the proof of our proposition, whether the four-fifths of these one hundred and ninety millions of bushels of grain, are sent abroad as bread, wheat, corn, meal or flour; or whether they assume some other of the protean shapes of grain, and come down for export as live hogs and cattle,—or in barrels of pork and beef, lard, bacon, oil or whiskey, they are the surplus produce of those regions, every bushel of which enters in some shape or other into the channels of Southern and Western commerce.*

* *Commerce.* Up to the 14th of June last, there had arrived at New-Orleans, 1,065,000 bales of cotton; 67,400 hhds. of Tobacco, which was still arriving freely; 284,000 kegs, 202,450 barrels, and 1,422 hhds. of Lard, besides 921 barrels Lard Oil; 196,000 barrels, 2,400 hhds. and 6,806,000 lbs. (in bulk) of Pork; 105,000 barrels and sacks of wheat; 461,500 barrels of Flour; and 424,000 pigs of Lead; besides other articles, such as Bacon, Corn, Meal, Sugar, Beef, Copper, Lumber, Whiskey, Hemp, Bagging, Rope, Live Stock, &c. &c.

Valuing then, this produce, whether in its manufactured or raw state,—whether it be converted into meat or drink, at the low estimate of twenty-five cents a bushel, we have the sum of thirty-eight millions of dollars, to be added to the fifty* millions already accounted for. To this may be added three million of dollars for Southern rice, six million of dollars for Western tobacco, and as much for sugar—in all, one hundred and three millions of dollars, exclusive of lead,† iron, lumber, hemp, and naval stores, as the present annual amount of exports from the South and West.

New-York is indeed the principal focus of trade, the place where the great commercial fairs of the country are held. But the back country which sends down, through the inland channels of communication, its surplus produce to New-York for exportation, affords but a scanty supply when compared to that which supplies New-Orleans and the Gulf ports with their articles of commerce. The State of New-York grows no cotton, no hemp, no tobacco, no rice. Nor does it supply commerce with any of its sugar. The quantity of grain of all sorts, produced in that State, lacks one half of being as much to the inhabitant, as the general average of the whole United States gives to each person. If we allow but four and a half bushels of wheat to each person for bread, the people of that State will only average a peck apiece for export. So, if we take all the grain produced in that State, and deduct an average of twenty bushels for each person as the quantity consumed by man and beast, there will remain for commerce only about a bushel to each inhabitant. What other of the great staples of the country does New-York produce? She may have lumber and ashes, but when we come to reckon in millions, we shall find that these articles are trifling in amount. Much of the back country produce, we know, is drawn off from New-York by the Eastern States, through the Albany Rail Road. But giving her, through the Erie Canal, half of the surplus wheat crops of Ohio, Illinois, Indiana and Michigan, we shall find then, that her corn trade from the back country, does not amount to one-tenth part in value of the cotton trade from the South.

* The value of the cotton crop of 1841, though not so large by several hundred thousand bales, as that of 1842—the one we have been considering—was estimated, by the Commissioner of Patents, at $62,000,000.

† *Lead.* The Lead exported from New-Orleans alone, in the season of 1841-2, was 447,000 pigs, which, by the price current of the day, is quoted at $2.20 the pig, thus giving another million for this item.

Seeing, then, that New-York receives from her back country, through her inland trade, so small a portion of that produce which she sends out to all parts of the world, it may be asked whence then does she obtain it?

The answer to this question has an important bearing upon the subject of coast defences. New-York has her daily or her weekly line of packets, plying between her wharves and every port of any commercial importance in the United States. Through these, and vast fleets of coasters, she collects together the surplus produce of other States, with which she carries on her immense trade. Not so with New-Orleans and the Gulf ports; they derive their exports almost exclusively through the rivers and roads of their back country.

Let us now, with a view of illustrating the bearings of this circumstance upon a wise sytem of national defences, suppose New-York to be blockaded by the fleet of an enemy, What degree of distress would the country at large suffer from it? The wheat of Northern Ohio, Indiana, &c. could go down the Mississippi. The naval stores from North Carolina,—the cotton and the rice, and other articles from the South,—the pork, &c. from the West, which are sent to New York for tran-shipment, are not shut out from the sea—they have the broad ocean free and open before them, and they could, without stopping at New-York, on their way, be shipped from their Southern ports direct for their foreign market place. This, it is true, would distress New-York herself, and embarrass one or two of her neighbors, perhaps; moreover, it might, at first, cause some little inconvenience to the mercantile community. But we are not considering its effects upon sections or classes. We speak of them in their bearings upon the nation at large, in their influence upon the industry, the prosperity and welfare of the great body of the people. In this light, such a blockade would be to the whole country like the stopping up of one of the outlets at the delta of the Mississippi; in either case, commerce would be thrown into new channels, a little turbid and perhaps inconvenient at first, because new; but, except to those in the immediate vicinity, whose land would be overflown, or property injured, there would be nothing in the blockade of New York like public distress, nor any great and overwhelming national calamity in it; for all the produce that is exported

thence, could, like the waters of the Mississippi, if obstructed in one channel, find new and other, and perhaps better outlets.

Now, on the other hand, let us suppose that this hostile fleet raises the blockade of New-York, and sends down a squadron of ships to occupy the Tortugas, and block up the Florida Straits. The cotton of the South cannot flow up the Mississippi. The torrent is obstructed in its mountain pass, and there is no other channel through which it can escape. If it cannot break away the barrier, and force its way out through this one, it must carry stagnation back to its very sources; and, with the reflux, spread ruin and desolation over the land. The commerce of the Gulf is thus struck down at a blow,—its only outlet is in the hands of an enemy,—our nearest naval station is at the North, a thousand miles distant and more,—his is among the West Indies, close at hand. Not a stich of canvass can leave the Gulf but by his leave. Pittsburg and Wheeling, Cincinnati and Louisville, now become as besieged cities; the wharves of St. Louis and Memphis, of Natchez and New-Orleans, have an enemy before them; and every town and hamlet throughout the whole length and breadth of the great Valley of the West, suffer a rigid blockade. At the North the spindles of Lowell cease to go round,—her operatives are thrown out of employment and are distressed for bread; and the twenty five millions of dollars invested in the cotton factories of New England, are sunk in the general ruin, for their supplies from the South are cut off. The waters of the Mississippi no longer teem with life and animation; throughout their fertile plains, the hand of industry is paralyzed, and the task of the husbandman becomes a burthen not to be borne, because the people have lost, with their commerce, the incentives of trade and the rewards of labor; they have no market for the produce of their lands, no merchandize in exchange for their corn and oil. In vain now, may their seed be prosperous,—in vain the ground may give her increase, and the heavens their dew; there will be among them at that day, "no hire for man, nor any hire for beast;" there will be no buying, no selling, no getting of gain among them.

Can there be anything, in the wide scope of legislation, more truly national in all its bearings, than the securing and making sure the command of such a passage as this? In

the whole range of coast defences, there is no point more important, nor half so much exposed. Should Congress, by an act, raze the forts on the Mississippi, and throw that river, from Memphis down, open to all nations, and make its navigation free, the commerce of the West could not be more exposed and defenceless, than it now is, when it enters the Straits of Florida on its way out to sea and a market What would it avail, though the West should send its produce to New-Orleans, if it could go no further? Unless a way out of the Gulf should be open to it, it would be far better off on the plantations where it was grown. The immediate borders on one side of this exposed and dangerous market path from the Gulf, are armed by Spain and England; on the other, by the United States. These two nations have done all that can be done to fortify and to strengthen themselves, on their side of this great commercial thoroughfare—while we have done nothing to secure a safe passage through it, for our vessels, though we have incomparably so much more at stake than they.

We have laid great stress upon the facility with which an enemy, in the Straits of Florida, might seriously annoy the Gulf commerce, and we have said it might be entirely destroyed by a force altogether insignificant and such as any third or fourth rate naval power could at all times command. Fully to appreciate the helplessness of merchantmen, and to illustrate the degree of panic and consternation which an armed cruiser, in search of prizes, spreads among them, we have only to recollect what has been done in other times, by our own cruisers.

In 1777, Captain Wilkes, in the Reprisal, with two small cruisers, made his appearance off the coast of England. In those days, it would have been treason to call those three small vessels—altogether not a match for one of our sloops-of-war of the present day—national cruisers—they were styled privateers. We quote from the papers of the day,—authentic extracts from which have been kindly furnished by a friend,—to show the alarm and distress which that small force spread among English shipping and commerce, where they had no narrow straits to pass through, but were under the guns of their own forts and castles, until they got out upon blue water in the open sea, and then had a thousand ships to give them convoy:

"*June* 26*th*, 1777.

"Orders were sent to Plymouth for two of His Majesty's frigates, to sail immediately on a cruise between Lisbon and Madeira, as some intelligence has lately been received, that several *American Privateers* were cruising about that place, and had stopped several English ships; but being in ballast had released them." Lad. Mag. July, 1777, Vol. 8, p. 387.

"*July* 2*d*, 1777.

"Orders were sent to the Commissioners of the several Dock Yards for the immediate fitting out of several sloops-of-war, to be employed as cruisers for the better protection of the trade."

"*July* 3*d*, 1777.

"Orders were sent to the Governors of Jersey and Guernsey for all the fortifications on the said Islands to be put in a proper state of defence."

"*July* 5*th*, 1777.

"Dublin has been thrown into the utmost state of consternation by the appearance of the American *Privateers* on this coast. *A stop is put to all* trade. Not one of the linen ships that were loaded for Chester Fair, are suffered to depart, upon which account the Fair must be postponed, if any Fair be held.

"The Lord Lieutenant has thought it expedient, lest the Americans should make any attempt upon the shipping in this harbor, to order cannon from the arsenal to form two batteries to defend the entrance of it.

"No insurance can be procured, and linen has already fallen a penny a yard.

"They are unloading the linen ships with the utmost diligence, for fear of an attempt to burn them; and all the vessels are drawn as near as possible to the bridge." Lad. Mag. July, 1777, Vol. 8, p. 388.

Copy of a letter from Philip Stephens, Secretary of the Admiralty, to William Corslin, Mayor of Liverpool:

"*July* 11*th*, 1777.

"My Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty having stationed the Albion (74), Exeter (64), Arethusa (32), and Ceres (sloop-of-war), between the coasts of Great Britain and Ireland, in quest of American *Privateers*, and for the protection of trade in those parts, I am commanded by their lordships to acquaint you thereof," &c. &c. Lad. Mag. July, 1777, Vol. 8, pp. 389–90.

"*Saturday*, *July* 12*th*, 1777.

"The American *Privateers* having made several captures on the Scotch and Irish coast, the merchants and inhabitants of Greenock and Glasgow, have entered into subscriptions for fitting out four armed vessels for the protection of their own trade." Gent. Mag. July, 1777, Vol. 47, p. 349.

"*July* 14*th*, 1777.

"One hundred and twenty ships of the British Navy are now in commission, viz:—55 ships of the line, 46 frigates, and 19 sloops-of-war. But in consequence of repeated information being sent to the

Admiralty Board, of the *great number* of American *Privateers* (only three) cruising in the Irish Channel, contracts are made by government for several ships, which are to be fitted out as armed ships for the better protection of the trade." Lad. Mag. July 1777, Vol. 8, p. 389.

"*White Haven, July 15th*, 1777.

"During no time since the war, were the people on this coast, half so much frightened as they have been lately on the appearance of the American *Privateers*. An express went off to our Lord Lieutenant, (Sir James Lowther,) of the County of Cumberland, to call out the militia for the defence of the coast, as they were apprehensive that the Americans would land; to which Sir James sent word that he would immediately call out the militia, and that it might be as little detrimental to the country as possible, he would divide the time, and fix the first fortnight now, the other after harvest. Three companies are accordingly stationed here." Lad. Mag. July, 1777, Vol. 8, p. 389.

A list of line-of-battle ships, cruising in the English Channel, is then given. It shows that there were twenty-eight.

"*July 17th*, 1777.

"The Lords of the Admiralty have ordered Capt. Burdon, of His Majesty's sloop, the Drake, to cruise between Harwich and Goree, in the track of the packet boats, for the protection of the said vessels, and of the trade of His Majesty's subjects. She sailed on the 6th inst. from the Downs on that service."

"*July 21st*, 1777.

"The Lords of the Admiralty have been pleased to order two ships of-war and a sloop, to cruise between the Mull of Calloway and Contyn."

"*July 22d*, 1777.

"Orders have been sent from the Admiralty to Portsmouth for seven frigates, in addition to those already sailed, to proceed to the North of Ireland, in search of American *Privateers* that infest that coast."

"*July 23d*, 1777.

"Orders have been issued for repairing the fortifications at Kinsale, the Cove of Cork, Waterford, Carrickfergus, and other ports of Ireland; and six frigates will be stationed in St. George's Channel, to prevent the future depredations of the Provincial *Privateers*." Lad. Mag. July, 1776, p. 389.

"*July 25th*, 1777.

"Orders were given from the War Office, for a general survey of ordnance and military stores in the several fortresses throughout Great Britain and Ireland."

"*July, 26th* 1777.

"The Mayor and Corporation of Londonderry, in Ireland, have raised a subscription of six hundred pounds, to repair the fortifications of that city, and likewise to fit out a ship-of-war of twenty-eight guns, for the protection of their trade."

"*August* 11*th*, 1777.

"Orders have been given to the artificers in His Majesty's Dock Yard at Deptford, to work double tides in building two small vessels which are to carry twenty guns each, and to cruise against Americans in the channels."

"*August* 12*th*, 1777.

"Press warrants are issued for landsmen at all the principal towns in England and Wales."

"*August* 14*th*, 1777.

"The number of line-of-battle ships now on cruises round England, and lying in the several ports of Portsmouth, Plymouth and Cheltenham, amount to thirty-two, from sixty to ninety guns." Lad. Mag. August, 1777, Vol. 8, pp. 443-4-5.

"*London, August* 25*th*, 1777.

"The Secretary of the Admiralty has written to Capt. Battorel, (the regulating officer at White Haven,) informing him that the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty have directed the Navy Board to hire a number of armed ships, capable of carrying twenty guns at least, to be employed as coasting convoys, for the protection of the trade of the several great trading towns of the kingdom, provided such towns will respectively engage to raise men to man them."

"*New-Castle, August* 30*th*, 1777.

"In consequence of a petition from the masters and owners of ships of this port, to his Majesty, seconded by Sir Matthew White Ridley, Bart., one of our members, an order from his Majesty in Council has this week been received, to permit the *ships in the coal trade*, to take on board guns and stores for defence, in case of an attack from an enemy." Lad. Mag. Sept., 1777, Vol. 8, p. 499.

The coasts of England were surrounded with armed cruisers, and her harbors bristled with cannon, yet such is the picture, drawn from the papers of that day, of the alarm and distress created in the realm, by three small American cruisers. In comparison, our Gulf commerce is perfectly defenceless. Instead of passing from port at once out upon the broad ocean, it must first sail through a long and narrow channel, with the unoccupied harbors of Key West and the Tortugas in its very entrance, hundreds of miles removed from the nearest dock yards. With these harbors thus situated, the enemy, at the first notes of war, will not fail to land his guns at them, throw up his water batteries to defend them, and thus secure his position in this strong hold, from which he cannot be removed, and from which he may command the Gulf, with its floating millions.

Are the Southern and Western States content that their commerce and coasts should continue in such a defenceless and vulnerable state? If three small vessels in the Irish sea, thousands of miles from home, without a harbor of refuge

or place of rendezvous, could stop Chester Fair and the Dublin trade,—if they could destroy insurance, cause the ships in port to be unloaded, and linen to fall a penny a yard,—if they could call out the whole English Navy in pursuit, force the crown to hire and to buy other ships, compel the artificers at the Deptford Docks to work double tides in building more,—if they could cause press-gangs to raise the voice of wo and lamentation in every town throughout the kingdom,—if they could alarm the laborer in the field, and force the reaper in the harvest to lay down his sickle for a sword,—if a sloop, a brig and a cutter, along the distant coasts of England, and among swarms of armed cruisers, could do all this, in spite of her "wooden walls," their strength and numbers, might not an enemy, equally bold and daring, and with a few more dashing cruisers like these, having their ports of refuge in the West Indies, close at hand, spread as great alarm among the people of the South, causing their cotton to fall its penny a pound, and creating like distress among the ships of New-Orleans and the trade of the Gulf?

Do the people who send to market through the Gulf, bear sufficiently in mind the fact, that, for years past, they have contributed largely of their substance, in building up a system of harbor and naval defences at the North, almost to the entire neglect of their own? Are they aware that they have lent their aid in fortifying the coast from Norfolk up, at the average rate of a gun for every three hundred and eighty yards, while their own coasts to the South, can only count one to its three thousand yards? Are these people heedless of the necessary preparations now, because they prefer, when the evils of war do come, to immitate the colliers of New-Castle, the merchants and people of Greenock and Glasgow? Have they already "cut and dried" their petitions praying Congress for leave to arm and man their cotton ships? Do they continue to listen to the yearly cry of give! give! for preparing and making ready for building and fortifying at the North, because they are ready, when the emergency does come, to go round with their subscription lists, begging each other for money to build and fit out men-of-war of their own? Are they careless of their Gulf defences and their commerce now, because, in war, they can throw up ramparts of cotton bags in a night, and are

able to build up in a day, and maintain a Navy on private account?

If such be their views and disposition, we tell them they are mad. All the ships that they can build, all the cotton traders and colliers that they can arm, will be of no avail, their cotton bags of no use, unless the Dry Tortugas be occupied as a military and naval station before hand. These islands must be fortified. Without it, there can be no safety in war for the commerce of the West, and, without it, there can be no protection for the trade of the South.

Who, but the Southern and Western people, should defend their own firesides? Therefore, into their hands, should the defences of the Gulf be committed. The Navy that is kept there, should be taught to look upon those regions as its home; they are now as a foreign station to our ships in the Gulf. When one of them ends her cruise in the Gulf, she goes to the North to be laid up. her men are taken to the North there to be paid off and discharged: if anything is wanting for the ships, she sends to the North for it. If she meet with any accident, or sustain any injury, she goes straight there to have it examined or repaired. There the ship, her officers and her crew, are all sent to spend their money, and they consider it their *home*. With a dock yard at Memphis, for steamers, their supplies and their crews should be all drawn from the river towns. When the vessels are to be repaired, or laid up and discharged, they should be sent there. There they should be manned and paid off. That, and not the North, should be *their* home.

General Jackson had been down upon the Gulf coast during the war. As a military man, he at once saw the necessity, and comprehended at a glance, the value which some strong point in the Straits of Florida, would prove to this country. So fully alive was he to the importance of protecting them in peace, and of commanding them in war, that a short time after he reached the presidential chair, he declared to a friend, that the three things which he had most at heart, were, to pay off the national debt, to fortify the Dry Tortugas, and to break down the United States Bank. Accordingly, one of the first acts of his administration, was to order an examination of those islands. The survey was made in 1829, by Captain Tattnall, of the Navy.

The result of this survey was turned up the other day among piles of rubbish at Washington, where it chanced to meet our eye. With this chart under the bushel, we have often heard it admitted, from all sides, on the floors of Congress, that a strong naval station at the South was of the first importance to a proper system of national defences; but it has always been added in the same breath, you have no harbors there of sufficient water. To amuse Southern members, vessel after vessel has been sent there, on what has been called the "Survey of Southern harbors." But the officers in charge have not been directed to search for harbors of the requisite depth of water; they have been sent to survey those which it was already known had not water enough to admit frigates and larger vessels. Since Captain Tattnall's survey, the Tortugas have always received the go-by. His chart of them has never been suffered to see the light, while those of Beaufort, Wilmington, Sappelo, Deboy, Brunswick, St. Joseph's, and others, with their eight, twelve, or sixteen feet of water, or other practical objections, have been published by the thousands, and scattered to the four winds. This game has been going on for the last twelve or fourteen years, though fancy could not form, nor imagination draw a more beautiful harbor,—one more advantageously situated, or better calculated for all the purposes required of one there, than that which Capt. Tattnall visited and surveyed at the Tortugas. His chart is on a large scale, and the description which he gives of the harbor and its advantages is rather tame than overwrought:

"The outer harbor," says he, in his official Report of 28th February, 1830, "is in the centre of the whole group of Keys and Reefs. Its extent is one and three-quarters by one and a half miles, and its depth generally eight* fathoms. It has three entrances from sea, with water *sufficient for the largest vessels.* We have no hesitation in recommending it as a safe and commodious man-of-war harbor. The small harbor consists of two basins, the largest of which is 1200 by 700 yards—the smallest 600 by 400 yards. The depth of the former is from 28 to 40 feet—of the latter, from 16 to 24. The entrances are from the outer harbor by channels of 35 feet into the large, and 23 feet into the small basin. The two basins are connected by a channel of 23 feet; so that vessels may haul from one into the other. This harbor is so completely walled in by the Keys and Flats, that the water, in the heaviest gales, is perfectly smooth. It is indeed a *natural Dock*, as easy of access and as safe as can be desired. It would accommodate the greater part of our Navy."

* Forty-eight feet. The draft of a seventy-four is about twenty-six feet.

As for the facilities of supplying the place in the event of war, Captain Tattnall continues:

"The Keys and Reefs occupy of circumference a thirty miles: the three channels from the sea, for large ships, are all in different directions, and there are numerous passages through the reefs, by which vessels of light draft of water might enter the harbor. To these may be added the excellent navigation for small vessels through the whole Florida Reef," &c. from which supplies could be received at all times.

And, as to the susceptibility of defence, he remarks:

"On this point, we can merely venture an opinion, as our profession does not lead us to any accurate knowledge of the subject."

But, what the modesty of this meritorious officer would not allow him to do, has been done by the most skillful engineers and the most able military men of the country.

We quote from a very valuable Report, made by a Board of Army Officers on national defences. House Doc. No. 206 – 1st Session 26th Congress:

"A naval force, designed to control the navigation of the Gulf, could desire no better position than Key West or the Tortugas. Upon the very way-side of the only path through the Gulf, it is, at the same time, well situated as to all the great ports therein. It overlooks Havana, Pensacola, Mobile, the mouths of the Mississippi, and both the inlet and the outlet of the Gulf.

"The Tortugas harbors, in particular, are said to afford shelter for vessels of every class, with the greatest facility of ingress and egress. And there can be no doubt, that an adversary, in possession of large naval means, would, with great advantage, make these harbors his habitual resort, and his point of general rendezvous and concentration for all operations on this sea. With an enemy thus posted, the navigation of the Gulf, by us, would be imminently hazardous, if not impossible; and nothing but absolute naval superiority would avail any thing against him. Mere military means could approach no nearer than the nearest shore of the continent.

"It is believed that there are no harbors in the Gulf at all comparable with these, that an enemy could resort to with his larger vessels. To deprive him of these, would, therefore, be interfering materially with an organized system of naval operations in that sea. The defence of these harbors would, however, do much more than this. It would transfer to our own squadron, even should it be inferior, these most valuable positions, and it would afford a point of refuge to our Navy and our commerce, at the very spot where it would be most necessary and useful. By occupying two, or at most three, small islands, the harbors of the Dry Tortugas (there being an inner and a outer harbor) may be thoroughly protected."

Only three millions of dollars,—less than the harbor defences of Norfolk have cost—are required, according to the estimates of the Engineer Department, to put both Key West and the Tortugas in a complete state of defence. What are three millions in comparison with the interests at stake? It is not a tithe of what the South and West have paid for the defences of the North. No,—it is scarce a tithe of the taxes levied every year in tariffs of revenue and protection upon these two regions, and taken from them, either directly in the shape of Navy and Army appropriations, or, indirectly in the shape of bounties, and expended at the North.

But, let us view the subject in another light:

England has hedged us in at the South, with a chain of islands and military posts and naval stations, so closely linked, that the sound of her cannon might be heard in one unbroken line, from the mouths of the Orinoco to the waters of Southern Georgia. But this military net-work would avail her little in her schemes of ocean grandeur, unless, while there is peace, she should create and foster a commercial marine, sufficient to supply her with the *personnel* requisite to meet her heavy demands for seamen in war. The sceptre of the seas is the cherished object of her heart, and though she has moved nations and stirred up kingdoms, and filled the world with alarms, at her fetes in battle on account of it, there never was a time when she has made greater efforts, than she is now making, to preserve the trident in her own, and to keep it from the hands of others. For the most part, these efforts and sacrifices are powerful, it is true, but the time has come, when she must, with her own hands, throw down one, or consent to see each in the great trio of her national idols, gradually shorn of its power and grandeur. Grinding corn laws have built up an agricultural interest on principles at variance with the manufacturing and commercial prosperity of the realm. From time to time this interest has been trenched upon more and more, gradually to enlarge the privilege of the other two. If we look back into the commercial and agricultural history of England, we shall find that the time was, when the legislature declared trade with France a *nuisance*, and that it was once against the laws to export corn or cattle; then came an export duty, and then a bounty on the latter. And even a few years ago, it could not be imported, until famine was about to come upon the land. But, as other nations have

increased in commercial importance, and begun to compete with Great Britain in manufactures and trade, she has redoubled her efforts and multiplied her sacrifices. Lest she should be overtaken in the race, she has continually pampered her ships with some privilege at the expense of the landed interest. The crown has remitted all duties to it, on Western pork and lard, imported into the English West Indies; the object of this, is to feed her operatives cheap, to open a market for their wares, and to create a monopoly of trade for English ships, by making them the carriers of this produce; for, being thus admitted, it becomes, by a figment of Parliament, colonial produce, and therefore must reach the mother country and her dependencies, if at all, in English bottoms.

Now, while we write, the Ministry have staked their places upon the Canada Corn Bill,—another encroachment upon the former privileges of the agriculturists, for the benefit of commercial and manufacturing interests of the realm. In advocating the passage of this bill, the British Premier resorted to artifice, and was guilty of a quibble. As to its operation, he represented to the manufacturers that it would make bread cheap, and to the farmers that it would keep up the price of their corn. And not to excite the fears of his agricultural friends, in Parliament, he quoted from McCulloch, to show that the United States are not a grain growing country!

The average price of wheat in England, for the few last years, has been from $1.44 to $1.50 the bushel. The whole charge for duties and freight, between Canada and England, will not exceed thirty cents. Unless wheat can be brought over from Pomerania and the Baltic, and delivered in Canada cheaper than it can be from Ohio and the Western States, this bill will, in all probability, give rise to a new and extensive trade, through Canada, with England, all of which will be carried on in English bottoms; if so, it will have the effect of keeping the price of corn, in England, below the mark on the sliding scale, at which direct importation of wheat may take place from foreign countries. Besides the encouragement to the shipping interest—of the welfare of which, the policy of the Prime Minister shows that he never loses sight for a moment—is there not, also, in the two bills of corn to Canada and pork to the West Indies, a double object in view? Are they not intended to benefit English man-

ufacturers by their effect upon American legislation, in modifying the high tariff notions of the Western people? Will not these States, who shall send their produce to market through either of the channels thus opened, be likely, as the trade becomes flourishing, to receive an intimation from the other side of the water, that these channels may be closed again, unless the so called spirit of reciprocity be manifested in our halls of legislature, towards certain articles of English manufacture?

With such measues as these in agitation in England, Mr. Webster, in declaiming against the *un*reciprocal advantages of reciprocity treaties, appealed, in his speech of September, 1842, at Fanueil Hall, "to a shipping merchant on his right, to say, if it were not true, that a great portion of the carrying trade of this country is done in foreign bottoms." "Mr. Rich," says the reporter, "replied emphatically, It is true." But had Mr. Rich been asked to say, why it is that it should be true, he would, as a shipping merchant, hardly have ascribed it wholly as Mr. Webster then, and afterwards in Baltimore also, did, to the effect of "reciprocity treaties." As a shipping merchant, he should have referred for explanation to the Report of his neighbor, Mr. Saltonstall, from the Committee on Manufactures, and which ushered in the present tariff, and we should have asked him to contrast the exhibits there made, touching our shipping interest, with the policy of Great Britain in regard to hers, and then to say, if the tariff arguments there presented do not contain their own refutation, and show that the loss of our carrying trade is attributable rather to our system of protection than to our reciprocity treaties.

In this Report, the sail makers of New-York represent, that their trade has dwindled down to a mere patching business, for the want of protection. Mr. Olson tells the Committee, (we give, in a note,* the statement of an account presented by him,) that the ships from New-York are in the habit of buying their sails in Europe; and that they buy there for one thousand five hundred dollars, a suit of sails which he could not furnish here for less than two thousand one hundred dollars. Therefore, says he, protect us. Tax the profitable labor of the ship six hundred dollars, and every suit of sails, for our benefit. Instead of allowing her

* For Note to this page see end of Article.

to sail cheap, and to freight low, and therefore to compete in the carrying trade, with the ships of other nations, saddle her with the burthens of protection for the encouragement of your sail makers. The cord-wainers and the ironmongers, and the host of artificers concerned in the building and equipment of ships, all hold the same language. Instead of allowing the ship owner to buy where he can buy cheapest, create us a monopoly on his ships, say they, and compel him to buy from us at home; and, for this privilege, make him pay the sail maker a bounty of six hundred dollars every year or two; the cord-wainer, quite as much; the forger of chains and anchors, a little more; and so on down to the plumber and painter. And, for what? Not that our ships may fetch and carry cheap, and compete with those of other nations in the great business of the ocean,—not that the State may have a nursery for seamen to meet its exigencies in war,—not that they may give us power at sea, and strengthen us at home, and develope for us, the true elements of national greatness and maritime consequence. No, not for these: but that a few work-shops at the North may rival the *Estancos* of Spain in oppressive monopolies, and that the American ship master may enjoy the great and glorious privilege of having, for a good large bounty, his own countrymen to stitch his sails—to lay his rope, and to weld his ground tackling for him. Congress lends a willing ear, and passes its "bills of abominations." Thus the operations of the tariff are extended from the land to the sea, and made to bear upon the labor of the sailor, as they do upon that of the South and West; the hard earnings of all are wrung from them to make more profitable the calling of the Northern artificers. And here we will add, by way of parenthesis, that we are not of those who maintain that the cotton growers exclusively pay the protection, and the producer, the duties. We maintain that the consumer pays the duties, and the profitable laborer of the country, the bounties of protection,—and, therefore, the South and the West being the chief seat of the profitable and unprotected laborer of the country, that these two regions pay for the protection to the Northern manufacturer, precisely as the ship pays the protection to the sail-maker.

With these burthens, can American ships compete with English bottoms as carriers, who are protected and privileged, and allowed all their provisions and every article in ship-

chandlery, in bond, or duty free? A commercial friend in Liverpool has been chartering ships there to come over here in ballast, and to carry back cargoes of cotton from our Southern ports, at a half penny freight, which is far below the rates at which American ships can carry, even with the advantage of a return cargo. Is it not owing to this circumstance, rather than to any "reciprocity treaty" with the little town of Bremen, we would ask Mr. Rich, that we are losing the carrying trade of our own country?

The agricultural interests of England have, for ages past, been considered as one of the chief sources of the wealth and greatness of the realm. The contest that she is now carrying on for her ocean supremacy, is not with foreign states nor a strange people; but it is in a war among her own members. She is making ready to lay her own hands upon what she once considered the life of the land. Therefore, it is, we say, that that country has never before been making greater efforts, than she is now making, to preserve her power and consequence on the seas. It must be a severe trial to the stout hearts of those "good old English country gentlemen," renowned in song, to see their agricultural Penates taken away from them, and offerred up, one by one, by the son of a cotton spinner, on altars beyond the sea, to propitiate the great Molock of trade.

While England, our great rival in peace, and chief foe in war, is doing all this to fortify and strengthen herself at sea, and before our very doors, does it not become us also to guard our weak points, and to put ourselves in an attitude of defence in case of war? We have thousands of watermen on the Western rivers, ready, at a moment's warning, to take up arms in the Navy for the defence of their shores. With these as a reserve, we want but a boat-yard on the Mississippi, from which we can build, equip and send down a steam Navy to succor the Tortugas, and to protect and defend our Gulf trade, in spite of any force which an enemy might place to the North of those reefs, to compel our Navy from the North into a general action, before it could enter the Gulf. Memphis has been examined for this purpose, by three intelligent officers of the Navy. Their report is highly favorable, and all that the friends of the measure could wish. With the wedge thus tipped and entered, we hope to see it driven home at the approaching session of Congress. With great liberality, and a spirit of patriotism worthy of

their State, the authorities of Memphis have offered the site fixed upon by these officers—and which is within the city—as the most suitable one for the dock yard, at twenty thousand dollars.

Before we dismiss the subject of balancing the federal patronage, and of distributing it equally to all sections as far as is consistent with the public weal and conducive to the object in view, we would have, on the Western side of the equation a naval school to balance West Point in the East. This subject and that of the Memphis dock yard have been fully discussed, in the letters of Harry Bluff, to Mr. Clay, published in the Southern Literary Messenger of 1839, to which the reader is referred for views in detail.

NOTE TO PAGE 343.

* Witness states that, since his former examination, he has been at home, New-York, and procured the cost of a suit of sails, in New-York and in Liverpool, which he submits to the Committee, and is hereunto annexed, marked A. The statement was procured from the most authentic sources, and may be relied on. James W. Olson.

A.

Statement, showing the cost of a suit of sails, of the best English duck, for a ship of 700 tons, at the port of New-York:

Required 100 bolts of duck of 40 yards each, at $14.50 per bolt, light and heavy averaged,	$1,450 00
Cost of materials for working up, including bolt rope, &c. at $3 per bolt,	300 00
Cost of labor working, at $3 per bolt,	350 00
	$2,100 00

Statement, showing the cost of same for same in Liverpool:

Required 100 bolts of duck of 40 yards each, at $11 per bolt,	$1,100 00
Cost of working up, including labor, bolt rope, &c.	400 00
	$1,500 00

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